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In recent years influential academic and public figures have argued that a greater role ought 
to be accorded to religious tribunals or “minority legal orders” by the legal system.1 These 
suggestions have been extremely controversial but recently the law in the UK has taken a 
significant step towards expanding this role. This is seen most clearly in the decision of the 
High Court of England and Wales in AI v MT2 where the High Court accorded a major role to 
a Jewish religious court in divorce proceedings before it. This article suggests that the 
approach of the Court is to be regretted and that the academic arguments offered in favour 
of the approach adopted by the judge are unconvincing for four reasons. First, the judicial 
decision and academic commentary has proceeded on the flawed premise that a failure to 
allow religious courts to take on jurisdiction over matters of state law forces members of 
religious communities to choose between their faith and their legal entitlements. Second, 
the chief safeguard proposed, namely the review of religious decisions by secular courts to 
review to ensure compliance with fundamental rights, is inadequate. Third, the idea of the 
state using access to secular legal powers as a means to pressurise religious bodies to 
change their religious law is unlikely to succeed and involves inappropriate interference with 
religious freedom. Finally, I want to suggest that arguments in favour of facilitating 
individuals in reducing their interaction with the state legal system strikes at the heart of 
meaningful citizenship and are underpinned by a consumerisation of both law and religion 
that cheapens both citizenship and religious belief and risks undermining the sustainability 
of multi-ethic societies.  
 
Background 
The role of religion in the legal system of Western democracies has become increasingly 
controversial in recent times. Ayelet Shachar’s 2001 book Multicultural Jurisdictions3 has 
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proved particularly influential. Within the British context her ideas received notable support 
from the former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams4 and Professor Maleiha Malik.5 
Shachar’s work attempts to justify expanding the role of religious groups in the legal system 
while at the same time being sensitive to the fact that this can risk compromising the rights 
of some within the minority group (most notably women and sexual minorities). She 
proposed an approach characterised as “transformative accommodation” under which 
religious bodies are allowed to take over functions of the state legal system but in a 
conditional way which encourages them to themselves reduce the discriminatory nature of 
the norms they apply. She envisages a process underpinned by ideas of competition and 
market-share under which the self-interest of the religious group in question will seek to 
attract as many members of the group as possible by developing their norms so as to 
minimise discrimination against certain kinds of member. 6  
Malik’s work builds on these ideas. Like Shachar, she acknowledges that there are certain 
risks in expanding the role of what she calls “minority legal orders” noting that “in practice it 
will be difficult for individuals, especially those who lack power to “exit” from their group 
and that “vulnerable groups” such as women and LGBT individuals face particular dangers of 
oppressive or discriminatory treatment by religious legal orders. She also acknowledges that, 
as Ahmed showed, “having a religious option may increase the perceived disloyalty of 
pursuing the state option”7 and that social pressure to use religious courts may be intense.8 
Nevertheless, Malik argues that recognition of religious tribunals is justified as a model, can 
be devised that applies only when individuals choose to submit themselves to it and where 
state courts supervise the eventual judgments “severing” elements of religious rulings that 
fall foul of fundamental rights norms. 
Like Williams, she suggests that this allows individuals “to simultaneously retain their 
membership of their minority legal order and at the same time enjoy the protection of a 
liberal legal order and state courts”9 and argues that religious courts have the advantage of 
greater knowledge of the norms of a religious group that state courts. In line with Shachar’s 
marketplace ideas, Malik suggests that empowering religious courts can ensure better 
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provision of “services” such as religious divorce that many women in minority communities 
desire.10 Her conclusion is that the best approach is a conditional empowerment of religious 
courts to exercise authority over matters of secular law subject to supervision by state 
courts for compliance with fundamental rights and equality norms. This, Malik feels, will lead 
to benefits to individuals as well as allowing the state to incentivise religious courts to 
develop religious norms in the direction of tolerance and equality.11   
AI v MT and Its Defenders 
The influence of the points made by figures such as Shachar, Malik and Williams can be seen 
in the case of AI v MT in the English High Court where Baker J was faced with a contentious 
divorce case, including issues of child custody, between an Orthodox Jewish couple who 
requested that their dispute be resolved by the New York Beth Din. Baker J sought 
information from the Beth Din on their approach to the case, particularly in relation to the 
question of the importance of the best interests of children. Having received the reply that 
“In conjunction with Halacha the best interests of the children are the primary consideration 
in resolving cases like this.” Baker J referred their disputes to a process of arbitration before 
the New York Beth Din on the basis that the outcome, although likely to carry considerable 
weight with the court, would not be binding and would not preclude either party from 
pursuing applications to this court in respect of any of the matters in issue.”12 There was, at 
the time, (February 2010), no precedent for arbitration in family law proceedings.13 The High 
Court subsequently ratified the decision of the Beth Din on the grounds that it was 
consistent with the best interests of the children and was satisfactory from a financial point 
of view.14  
 
An Obligation to Choose between Religious Identity and State Courts? 
Williams, Baker J and Malik have all suggested that to refuse to allow individuals to choose 
to have their family law disputes adjudicated upon by religious courts in some way forces 
people to choose between membership of their religious community and their citizenship. A 
refusal to broaden the jurisdiction of religious courts to cover jurisdiction over secular 
matters, does not require anyone to leave their faith or prevent them from using a religious 
tribunal to obtain a religious divorce or religious annulment. The existence of religious 
                                                          
10 M. Malik “Minorities and the Law: Past and Present”, Current Legal Problems Vol.67 (2014), p.83. 
11 M. Malik “Minorities and the Law: Past and Present”, Current Legal Problems Vol.67 (2014), p.90. 
12 AI v MT [2013] EWHC 100 (Fam) at [14]-[15]. 
13 AI v MT [2013] EWHC 100 (Fam) at. [20]. 
14 AI v MT [2013] EWHC 100 (Fam) at. [37]. 
tribunals empowered to decide on religious matters is not in dispute. Indeed, a secular state 
should regard itself as incompetent to rule on religious matters and should therefore not 
interfere with the right of religious bodies to decide religious matters according to their own 
norms. As Baker J noted, in AI v MT, arbitration in family law cases has been unknown until 
recently in the UK yet this has not prevented Catholic religious tribunals ruling on issues such 
as annulment (for religious purposes) of a marriage or Sharia tribunals ruling on religious 
divorce for British Muslims.15 Indeed, the 2013 debate on the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage and the protections given to religious bodies in the relevant legislation, underlined 
the key importance for religious freedom and equal rights of the distinct nature of religious 
marriage and civil marriage.  
 
The fact that individuals need to obtain religious permission to remarry within their faith 
does not mean that bodies granting such religious permission necessarily need to be 
empowered to rule on matters of state law and civil marriage. Leaving religious courts free 
to rule on religious matters and leaving state courts to rule on matters of civil law, merely 
involves the recognition that in a multi-faith society one’s membership of a religious 
community is not all encompassing, does not extinguish one’s rights and duties as a citizen 
and does not mean that one must restrict one’s use of communal institutions to a minimum. 
Such recognition is an unavoidable necessity of a meaningful shared life in a multi-faith 
society whether or not it is more challenging for those whose beliefs reflect religious 
traditions that have sometimes struggled with the concept of a secular legal and political 
order.16 
 
The true issue in AI v MT was not a request to use religious courts (which remain available 
for religious purposes) but to use (subject to state supervision) such courts for all purposes 
and therefore to restrict one’s interaction with the civil courts to a minimum. The idea 
behind this claim is that interaction with shared state institutions is in some way inconsistent 
with holding religious faith and must be minimised is troubling. Life in a multi-faith liberal 
democracy involves significant scope for living a religious life in common with others and 
making use of voluntary religious institutions but it also involves a recognition that there are 
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shared institutions and a broader life, beyond one’s own religious group that are valuable 
and should be engaged with. As religious tribunals remain available for religious purposes, 
the aim of expanding the authority of religious courts to cover matters of state law is not to 
allow use of religious tribunals but to restrict use of state courts to a minimal supervisory 
role. The idea that using the state courts for state purposes while using religious courts for 
religious purposes involves sacrificing religious identity strikes at the maintenance of multi-
faith societies with meaningful ideas of citizenship and commitment to engagement with 
communal institutions (see below). 
 
Inadequate Safeguards 
“Voluntary” Use of Religious Courts 
Neither Shachar nor Malik offer any real solution to the fact that the recognition of a 
religious alternative makes it difficult for individuals who may not want to use religious 
courts to avoid doing so as they can be labelled as traitors to their faith or group by choosing 
the state courts. In fact, having acknowledged this pressure as a problem, Malik is silent 
about what could be done to address it. It is simply inevitable that, even under a “voluntary” 
model, it is likely that some women or LGBT individuals (whose interests are unlikely to be 
favourably treated by religious courts), will be pressurised into using religious tribunals when 
they would prefer not to. This is not to deny that such individuals have agency in these 
matters but simply to note that if they resist such pressure and take their claim to state 
courts they will have to endure emotional and social costs which are not imposed on their 
fellow citizens who are not from minority groups when they exercise their fundamental right 
to use the state justice system. 
 
The Inadequacy of Supervision by State Courts 
Malik endorses the ruling in AI v MT is on the basis that individuals using religious courts will 
“enjoy the full protection of a liberal legal order and state courts” by virtue of the retention 
of a supervisory role over the secular decisions of religious courts by the state legal 
system.”17 It is far from certain that supervision by secular courts will be adequate to this 
task. There are many ways in which a minority or religious court can adopt a problematic 
approach or treat an individual before it in a less favourable way that are unlikely to show up 
as verifiable breaches of fundamental rights before a state court exercising a supervisory 
function.  
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 For example, it is far from clear that a religious court will have a conception of the best 
interests of the child that coheres sufficiently with those of a liberal and egalitarian society 
(and particularly the child’s interest in his or her ability to make independent decisions in 
future in relation to their religious, social, sexual or other identity). Indeed, despite being 
otherwise relatively supportive of the ruling in AI v MT, Judge Nasreen Pearce expresses 
surprise that Baker J agreed to religious arbitration given the complications in relation to the 
paramountcy of the best interests of the child that arise in religious tribunals.18  
 
Baker J declared himself satisfied in relation to the approach of the Beth Din of New York to 
the paramount nature of the best interests of the child on the basis of statement by a Rabbi 
attached to it who stated “At our Beth Din the rabbis follow Halacha in connection with 
resolving child custody disputes […]. In conjunction with Halacha the best interests of the 
children are the primary consideration in resolving cases like this”.19 It is unclear from this 
statement to degree to which the duty to adhere to Halacha may qualify the best interests 
of the child. To say that one accepts a particular principle is paramount “in conjunction with” 
compliance with religious law may mean very little if “in conjunction with” is seen as 
meaning “subject to”. Saudi Arabia, for example has ratified the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women subject to compliance with norms of Islamic 
law, something that has not resulted in adequate protection of the equal rights of Saudi 
women.20 A Jehovah’s Witness religious authority could also claim to be taking the best 
interests of the child into account “in conjunction with” their religious teachings in 
recommending that a child not be given a life-saving blood transfusion.   
 
Particular kinds of people may be particularly disadvantaged in this regard. Consider a 
lesbian mother seeking a divorce from her husband and custody of their children before an 
orthodox Beth Din, Sharia court or some form of Pentecostal Christian religious tribunal. 
Such decisions involve assessment of a range of imprecise and unquantifiable factors. It is 
unlikely that the courts’ overall view of that woman’s suitability as a parent (or even her 
deservingness of financial support) would be unaffected by the strongly negative religious 
teachings of Orthodox Judaism, mainstream Islam and Pentecostal Christianity on 
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homosexuality. This disapproval could manifest itself in many ways short of the kind of 
“smoking gun” discriminatory statement in the judgment necessary to alert the supervising 
state court to violation of fundamental rights or equal treatment. Fundamental rights 
represent a minimal standard that should not be violated, not a desirable standard. As 
practising lawyers know, judges have great discretion in disposing of cases and clients can 
obtain unusually negative results from a court without their fundamental rights being 
violated or the decision being readily appealable. Having subcontracted its duty to hear 
witnesses, assess credibility and take evidence to another tribunal, a state court exercising a 
supervisory jurisdiction will have to defer to a degree to the original decision maker. Indeed, 
in AI v MT, Baker J made it clear that he would “attach weight to the Beth Din’s decision”21 
meaning that a party disfavoured by that decision, even if he or she faced down social 
pressure to accept it and challenged it in state court, would face additional obstacles in 
asserting his or her rights before the civil courts.  
 
Religious Freedom and State Neutrality 
Defenders of greater recognition suggest that such recognition can be a “win-win” for liberal 
values, by guaranteeing the protection of the legal system of the liberal democratic state 
while also encouraging the liberalisation of religious norms. Just as Shachar envisages 
beneficial change to religious legal orders coming from a process of “non-exclusive 
competition for loyalties”22 Malik suggests that the state can “ensure internal change 
through mutual influence between state and the minority legal order” and can have “a 
complex system of incentives and penalties to ensure that the minority legal order changes 
its legal norms rather than lose members.”23 However, it is unclear why it should be 
assumed that the more liberal or egalitarian a religious legal order is the more popular it will 
be amongst believers. Adapting religious norms in a pro-LGBT fashion may well reduce the 
popularity of a religious tribunal amongst believers. Moreover, many religious bodies value 
adherence to truth over market-share. It is rather optimistic to imagine that discriminatory 
beliefs in relation, for example, to gender and sexual orientation in mainstream Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam which are the outcome of centuries of thought and theological reflection, 
will be readily changeable in order to enable religious courts to take over the administration 
of areas of family law. 
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More importantly, there are serious problems in principle with this degree of state 
interference in religious freedom. It is highly problematic for liberal states to hold out the 
prospect of access to state power to a religion on condition that that faith change its beliefs 
to accord with those favoured by the state and to punish “bad” faiths by denying them such 
power. Shachar and Malik reject the idea that the right to exit a group means that the state 
should not interfere with what Shachar calls systematic “violations of certain of its member’s 
citizenship rights”.24 However, if religious tribunals are restricted to religious matters and are 
not empowered to rule on the secular legal rights of their members, then the violation of 
citizenship rights need not arise.  
 
Shachar argues that a right to exit is not a solution as it places burdens on the individual 
“while relieving the state of any responsibility for the situation.”25 However, in a non-
totalitarian state there must things for which the state is not responsible. All fundamental 
rights come with costs. Free speech hurts feelings, and fair trial rights mean some guilty 
people go free. A pluralist liberal society will not interfere with the formation of peaceful 
groups with unpopular or unpalatable views.  The idea of state intervention to change the 
beliefs of voluntary group in order to alleviate the emotional or social costs of leaving for a 
person who is disfavoured by those beliefs is inconsistent with the most basic level of 
freedom of association. In addition, Shachar’s approach fails to pay sufficient heed to the 
fact that, as Ahmed powerfully argues, empowering religious bodies to rule on matters of 
secular law can increase the costs to individuals seeking to exit the religious legal system.26 
Indeed, if we are concerned about the emotional or social costs of leaving, a great 
advantage of not empowering religious courts to rule on matters of secular law is that it 
allows individuals to remain within religious communities that may discriminate against 
them without having to sacrifice their legal rights.   
 
Finally, if the state allows religions with objectionable beliefs to act as secular family law 
courts and uses the supervisory jurisdiction of the state courts to sever objectionable parts 
of religious judgments, this involves state institutions in directly assessing what religious 
beliefs are good and bad. It was precisely to avoid the State sitting in judgment on the merits 
of religious belief that religious matters were first recognised as distinct from matters of 
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state.  At the very least, it undermines the potential for the state to hold the allegiance of a 
religiously diverse population if its institutions are regularly called upon to assess which 
religious beliefs it accepts and which beliefs it rejects.  
 
Citizenship and History 
The promotion of role and jurisdiction of religious courts at the expense of the state legal 
system raises troubling issues for society as a whole. Encouraging members of minority 
groups to use religious courts to resolve secular matters subject only to supervision of the 
state legal system promotes a vision of society where individuals are encouraged to remain 
within particular religious or cultural groups to a maximum degree and where engagement 
with shared institutions such as the legal and education systems (that are an important basis 
of a shared experience and shared national identity) is radically reduced.  
 
It is possible that a society characterised by facilitation of the desire of particular groups to 
avoid engagement with common institutions to the maximum degree possible would remain 
cohesive and that its members will remain willing to pay taxes to support a welfare state for 
citizens with whom they share ever fewer experiences and institutions, but this strikes me as 
unlikely.27 National identities can and should change and be enriched by new perspectives 
but sustainable polities require some commitment to citizenship and a common life 
together. To regard the law and the legal system, one of the fundamental elements of our 
equal status as citizens, as merely a service that citizens should use is to strike at the heart of 
shared citizenship. To encourage citizens to disengage from the state legal system and to use 
alternatives which provide a tailored service more in tune with the desires of particular 
“consumers” involves a degradation of the idea of a common citizenship and a withdrawal 
from a fundamental element of a shared national life.  
 
Finally, Malik rightly states that there is a long history of parallel legal systems in Europe and 
that the embrace of the idea of equal citizenship before one law that applies equally to all is 
relatively recent. That the principle of one law for all and equality before that law were hard 
and relatively recently won does not mean that it is right to judge them to be, in Malik’s 
words, an “a-historical myth”. 28 Rather, they are precious elements of the egalitarian and 
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democratic order which has been built up over centuries of conflict. There is a long history of 
monarchical government, sexism, racism and homophobia in Europe but that does not mean 
that such principles should be facilitated by the legal system or that the identification of 
anti-racism, sexual equality and democracy as key principles of the constitutional order 
should be dismissed as a-historical myths. The legitimacy and worth of fundamental values 
are not dependent on universal acceptance over the centuries. 
  
Conclusion 
Religious bodies should be free to operate according to religious norms and to decide on 
religious matters such as religious divorce but the trend towards widening the use of 
religious arbitration in family law should not continue. Civil marriage is a public institution as 
well as a private matter between parties and the welfare of children of any such marriage 
provides a further powerful justification for restricting the ability of parents to “privatise” 
the resolution of their dispute. Religious courts may, as Malik argues, have greater 
knowledge of the norms and traditional beliefs of religious groups. However, they are often 
highly unrepresentative in terms of gender and will often have less knowledge of the norms 
and beliefs of liberal society or worse, highly problematic approaches to the equal status of 
groups such as women or LGBT individuals. It may not be possible to ensure genuine 
voluntary engagement with minority legal orders and the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction 
by state courts is no guarantee that vulnerable categories will not suffer mistreatment. 
 
Finally, encouraging disengagement from a legal system that shares and defines the rights 
and duties of all members of the community undermines ideas of a meaningful shared 
citizenship where people of diverse religious and other backgrounds can share common 
institutions and a life together at the same time as remaining members of vibrant religious 
groups.  Quite apart from the dangers to vulnerable groups such as women and gay 
individuals inherent in the empowerment of often reactionary religious bodies, to encourage 
the religious courts to take over large parts of the role of the legal system for their members 
is to follow a disintegrative ideal where the legal system is a service, individuals are 
consumers and where if there is not quite “no such thing as society”, then society is an 
increasingly balkanised affair and with ever shrinking spheres of shared interaction between 
diverse groups. Whatever moves to bring such a reality about are, they should not be 
regarded as progressive.  
 
